Aristotelian and Platonian institutions
Ever since the first universities opened in the late 11th century A.D., Europe's intellectual tradition has been Aristotelian, and while this has provided Europe with a continuously growing body of scientific thought, never mind the periodic reassessments of its value, its political value seems meagre.
Aristotle did of course try to convince his audience that the focus of the specialist would aid the generalist, even if the generalist would consider certain parts of the specialist's considerations to be of questionable merit. And in so far Aristotle succeeded and succeeds, he created and creates an intellectual climate, in which you hear first, document second and understand third, with a certain chance of negligence at every step along the way.
Is it thus any wonder that a populace well drenched in this attitude will listen to public declarations, no matter how boring, indecipherable or ostensibly absurd they may be?
And in so doing the populace evades its political responsibility.
Which is of course how the whole affair began, as some kind of crown worn by the already exalted Catholic Church, that it'd be not only morally superior as the trustee of the saviour, but also intellectually as Aristotle's heir.
Plato, on the other hand, tried to convince his audience that it might be special, because it understands what human insight allows a human being to understand, but what is not generally sought out.
It is obvious that Plato cares less about knowledge than the knower and Aristotle vice versa. But while Western Civilisation has readily accepted Aristotle's point and created the university system as a testament to it, has it ever seen Plato's?
Granted, all who have studied mathematics have seen Plato's point. But this strikes me as accidental.
My writings won't easily fit into the Aristotelian framework, certainly not their core. What I wrote about verse metre perhaps. And yet, I think all of this is essential (the core, not every single post) and by Aristotelian adherence undeservedly dismissed. But the Aristotelian institutions can of course really make no proper use of it, there'd have to be other, Platonian, institutions to that end, only that there are, to the best of my knowledge, none.
It is not a question of human nature. Human nature accepts Plato more readily than Aristotle, as people's love for spirited conversation in all its different incarnations demonstrates. Plato builds on it, he tries to cultivate it and turn it towards actually meaningful things. But in this he hasn't had the same success as Aristotle with us. When we listen to public discussions, we'll either hear a comedian speaking or an Aristotelian apostle. So no successful cultivation of our wit exists (outside of mathematics, that is).
What could be done?
Throw tomatoes at a professor of the law, who dares to explain the merits of the law in Aristotelian fashion? It might be a start. And merit is the key. And Prove the merit! a possible battle cry. We fail, when we grant a public speaker intellectual prestige before the fact. That should stop. In all modesty we should demand that any public speaker lay open the intellectual foundations on which he wants to build. And if he fails to convince us at any step, let him know, give him a chance to improve the argument, let him even go on, if he fails to do so, but let him know then that he's operating in thin air, as far as we're concerned.
If we showed some sense there, it would only be a question of time until Platonian institutions would spring up to prepare public speakers properly. And if that is too much sense from the public to ask for, then this could still be the standard in circles of influence influential enough to let Platonian institutions still spring up.
And thinking about it, this might very well be the defining criterion for the emergence of the rule of care, although it looks insufficient at first, but do you really think that any Platonian institution pertaining to general affairs could possibly spring up under the rule of unreason? So far at least it hasn't.
Aristotle did of course try to convince his audience that the focus of the specialist would aid the generalist, even if the generalist would consider certain parts of the specialist's considerations to be of questionable merit. And in so far Aristotle succeeded and succeeds, he created and creates an intellectual climate, in which you hear first, document second and understand third, with a certain chance of negligence at every step along the way.
Is it thus any wonder that a populace well drenched in this attitude will listen to public declarations, no matter how boring, indecipherable or ostensibly absurd they may be?
And in so doing the populace evades its political responsibility.
Which is of course how the whole affair began, as some kind of crown worn by the already exalted Catholic Church, that it'd be not only morally superior as the trustee of the saviour, but also intellectually as Aristotle's heir.
Plato, on the other hand, tried to convince his audience that it might be special, because it understands what human insight allows a human being to understand, but what is not generally sought out.
It is obvious that Plato cares less about knowledge than the knower and Aristotle vice versa. But while Western Civilisation has readily accepted Aristotle's point and created the university system as a testament to it, has it ever seen Plato's?
Granted, all who have studied mathematics have seen Plato's point. But this strikes me as accidental.
My writings won't easily fit into the Aristotelian framework, certainly not their core. What I wrote about verse metre perhaps. And yet, I think all of this is essential (the core, not every single post) and by Aristotelian adherence undeservedly dismissed. But the Aristotelian institutions can of course really make no proper use of it, there'd have to be other, Platonian, institutions to that end, only that there are, to the best of my knowledge, none.
It is not a question of human nature. Human nature accepts Plato more readily than Aristotle, as people's love for spirited conversation in all its different incarnations demonstrates. Plato builds on it, he tries to cultivate it and turn it towards actually meaningful things. But in this he hasn't had the same success as Aristotle with us. When we listen to public discussions, we'll either hear a comedian speaking or an Aristotelian apostle. So no successful cultivation of our wit exists (outside of mathematics, that is).
What could be done?
Throw tomatoes at a professor of the law, who dares to explain the merits of the law in Aristotelian fashion? It might be a start. And merit is the key. And Prove the merit! a possible battle cry. We fail, when we grant a public speaker intellectual prestige before the fact. That should stop. In all modesty we should demand that any public speaker lay open the intellectual foundations on which he wants to build. And if he fails to convince us at any step, let him know, give him a chance to improve the argument, let him even go on, if he fails to do so, but let him know then that he's operating in thin air, as far as we're concerned.
If we showed some sense there, it would only be a question of time until Platonian institutions would spring up to prepare public speakers properly. And if that is too much sense from the public to ask for, then this could still be the standard in circles of influence influential enough to let Platonian institutions still spring up.
And thinking about it, this might very well be the defining criterion for the emergence of the rule of care, although it looks insufficient at first, but do you really think that any Platonian institution pertaining to general affairs could possibly spring up under the rule of unreason? So far at least it hasn't.
Labels: 20, formalisierung, geschichte, gesellschaftsentwurf, gesellschaftskritik, gesetze, institutionen, rezension, sehhilfen, wahrnehmungen, ἰδέα, φιλοσοφία
Eingetragen Am/um
21:27
