Synchronising the Platonian sequence of forms of ruling with the cycles of the I Ching

I'm writing this post, because I have to. In the case of the Indo-European cycle I'm relying on European history from 1200 A.D. onward (in the most abstracted way). But in the case of the Semitic and the Tibeto-Japanese cycle I'll allow myself to guess. The major goal here is to show that the Platonian sequence and the cycles of the I Ching are separate, but combinable things.

The Indo-European cycle.

• aristocracy: rule of care (mountain),
• timocracy: rule of ruthlessness (fire),
• oligarchy: rule of heed (the abysmal),
• democracy: rule of opportunity / unreason (lake),
• tyranny: too brief to matter.

The Tibeto-Japanese cycle.

• aristocracy: too brief to matter.
• timocracy: rule of ruthlessness (fire),
• oligarchy: rule of heed (the abysmal),
• democracy: rule of measuredness (wind),
• tyranny: rule of Lust [German] (thunder).

The Semitic cycle.

• aristocracy: rule of care (mountain),
• timocracy: rule of measuredness (wind),
• oligarchy: rule of Lust (thunder),
• democracy: too brief to matter,
• tyranny: rule of opportunity (lake).

The definitions of the Platonian forms of ruling are given in the previous post. There might be some objections on whether they coincide with Plato's meaning in the case of timocracy and tyranny. Arguably my definitions of these are more benign.

The only statement made in the above that I'd like to highlight is that the Semitic king (i.e. the ruler of Lust) earns his recognition through cleverness (as is the rule for oligarchy), whereas the Tibeto-Japanese king earns it through power (as is the rule for tyranny). The former, although looked up to, has to play the game better than the rest and hence rely on allies (oligarchy), whereas the latter can count on voluntary subordination (tyranny).

It is true that I've used the term tyrant in a different sense before, more along the lines of a Semitic king as described here, but I was only concerning myself with the question of what makes a successful tyrant then, without allowing for regal recognition. But it might be better from a systemic point of view not to use that as the distinction, but to place the tyrant within the Platonic scheme and the king within the scheme of the I Ching.

As for the latter: The ruler of Lust channels the desires of his subjects, gives everybody a share in his regal fate. No fate is independent of his, and his ambition is the horizon under which his subjects live. His subjects might out of regard voluntarily subordinate themselves, but they may also not, the former choice making a tyrant. And vice versa there might be voluntary subordination, but no sense for the expression of the common will in the tyrant, let's say, when he's simply a hardened warrior or robber.

The right name for this tyrant who is no king is probably duke.