The case for a military coup

I stated in the previous post that we have three major problems today, one civilian and two military ones, namely

• an unconvincing course of our economic activity,
• paralysing international ties and
• an incomprehension of the specificity of the status quo, that there are alternatives and what defines which.
  

The latter is a military problem, because it leads to inapt conflict management, i.e. inapt recognition and understanding of conflicting systems. Now, the military won't solve the first problem, and it can't even begin to try to do so. But it will likely solve the second and the third problem, and nobody can solve the first problem, before the second and the third problem have been solved.

When we ask: Who else can do the same?, we have to keep two points in mind, namely

• what the proposed solution for the second and third problem means for the first and
• whether there is both the interest and the ability to solve anything.
  

That the military can't cope with the first problem isn't necessarily a disadvantage, for it leaves the door open for someone else to solve it later on. Competing approaches might muster the same organising muscle, but they may strive to rewrite our convictions and that means to throw away all that our ancestors have strived for in the last 1000 years. This may not be immediately apparent to the people, but only because of the third problem. And whether the people will still be able to do something about it when it becomes apparent to them will depend entirely on the skillfulness of the transition, i.e. whether enough power has been shifted prior to the realisation to parties that strive for other things.

In other words, if solving the second and third problem means killing Christianity, I want no part of it. Which leaves action by benefactors controlling the development by whatever powers they possess. They may do that of course by involving the military. However, if they do not, then for lack of spirit they'd have to resort to bribes and threats and that would quite naturally lend itself to prolonging, rather than reforming action, since the latter requires decisiveness. But a sufficiently general decisiveness is precisely what the first problem precludes, which is why it is as far as I can see the best thing to go with a partial decisiveness dealing with the military problems.

Well, we are stumbling along, moves have been made, however graceful our progress will be, it appears difficult to go back into a stable position, we'll have to move forward now. It is best to have a strategy going forward, if trouble appears one can always pray. Or is it better to succumb to someone else's strategy and pray every time it turns against one by its very design? If it has to be so, so it shall be, but I hardly figure it superior. I am of course aware of the fact that powerful people always overestimate their abilities. There will be trouble, improprieties are bound to occur. But I rather stay within the development of Christianity than not, that is to try another direction or to indulge in pipe dream sweetened procrastination.